nvey a false impression, is not a
right. This question has not unfrequently arisen with regard to anonymous
publications. It might be a fair subject of inquiry, whether anonymous
writing is not in all cases objectionable, on the ground that a sense of
personal responsibility for statements given to the public would insure a
more uniform regard to truth and justice, as well as greater care in the
ascertainment of facts, and more mature deliberation in the formation of
judgments and opinions. But if anonymous writing be justified, the writer
is authorized to guard his secret by employing a copyist, or by covert
modes of transmission to the press, or by avoiding such peculiarities of
style as might betray him. But if, notwithstanding these precautions, the
authorship be suspected and charged upon him, we cannot admit his right to
denial, whether expressly, or by implication, or even by the utterance of
a misleading fact. He undertook the authorship with the risk of discovery;
he had no right to give publicity to what he has need to be ashamed of;
and if there be secondary, though grave reasons why he would prefer to
remain unknown, they cannot be sufficient to justify him in falsehood.

*Is truth to be told to an insane person*, when it might be dangerous to
him or to others? May not he be deceived for his benefit, decoyed into a
place of safe detention, or deterred by falsehood from some intended act
of violence? Those who have the guardianship of the insane are unanimous
in the opinion that falsehood, when discovered by them, is always attended
with injurious consequences, and that it should be resorted to only when
imperatively required for their immediate safety or for that of others.
But in such cases the severest moralist could not deny the necessity, and
therefore the right, of falsehood. But it would be falsehood in form, and
not in fact. Truth-telling implies two conscious parties. The statement
from which an insane person will draw false inferences, and which will
drive him to an act or paroxysm of madness, is not truth to him. The
statement which is indispensable to his safety, repose, or reasonable
conduct, is virtually true to him, inasmuch as it conveys impressions as
nearly conformed to the truth as he is capable of receiving.

*Is falsehood justifiable for the safety of one's own life or that of
others?* This is a broad question, and comprehends a very wide diversity
of cases. It includes the cases, in which