ORNE, _14th December 1846._

The Queen has still to acknowledge Lord John Russell's letter of the
11th. She has carefully read the Duke of Wellington's letter to Lord
John, which evinces all the Duke's honourable feelings. He should
certainly be relieved from the appearance of having refused honours to
others, but agreed to the granting of them the moment it was intended
to couple the measure with an honour conferred upon himself. On the
other hand, the Queen still wishes the step to be taken as a means
of doing honour to the Duke. His name should, therefore, certainly be
connected with it. The introduction of the names of other commanders,
even of that of Sir John Moore, the Queen does not think advisable.
She does not quite understand from Lord John's letter whether he
proposes to adopt the Duke's recommendation to _re_-issue all the
medals formerly granted, or to adhere to the original idea of striking
a new one. In the latter case, which appears the most natural, the
word "Peninsula" would cover all the campaigns, and in these the Duke
of Wellington had by far so much the greatest share that his
name being introduced on _all_ the medals cannot be considered as
anomalous.

[Pageheading: CRACOW]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _14th December 1846._

The Queen returns the enclosed private letters.[31] The view Lord
Palmerston takes of the affair of Cracow appears to the Queen a very
sound one, and she would much wish to see the plan of a conference
realised against which Lord Ponsonby does not bring any very relevant
reasons. Prince Metternich's plan of a declaration "that the case is
to be considered an exceptional one and not to afford a precedent to
other powers" is too absurd. The Prince very justly compared it to the
case of a person giving another a box on the ear and declaring at the
same time that he is to consider it as exceptional, and that it is in
no way to afford him a precedent for returning it. The Queen hopes the
Cabinet will well consider the question, and contrive to find means to
prevent the evil consequences of the unjustifiable step against Cracow
by speaking out in time, before Russia or France may have decided on
acts of further infraction of the Treaty of Vienna. It seems quite
clear that Russia was at the bottom of the measure relative to Cracow,
and it is therefore but reasonable to expect that she has an ulterior
object in view.

[Footnote 31: The first