ging the whole character of
the book, and I have been compelled in general to meet the demand for
further explanation only by the above general reference to my other
books, by the addition of a few notes, and by appending to each chapter
some suggestions for more extended reading. These might of course have
been indefinitely enlarged, but a long list of books is apt to defeat
its own purpose: people with a limited time at their disposal want to
know which book to make a beginning upon.
The Lectures are therefore published for the most {xi} part just as
they were delivered, in the hope that they may suggest lines of thought
which may be intellectually and practically useful. I trust that any
philosopher who may wish to take serious notice of my views--especially
the metaphysical views expressed in the first few chapters--will be
good enough to remember that the expression of them is avowedly
incomplete and elementary, and cannot fairly be criticized in much
detail without reference to my other writings.
I am much indebted for several useful suggestions and for valuable
assistance in revising the proofs to one of the hearers of the
Lectures, Mr. A. G. Widgery, Scholar of St. Catherine's College,
Cambridge, now Lecturer in University College, Bristol.
H. RASHDALL.
NEW COLLEGE, OXFORD,
Jan. 6, 1909.
{xii}
CONTENTS
LECTURE I
MIND AND MATTER, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Is Materialism possible? There is no immediate
knowledge of Matter; what we know is always
Self + Matter. The idea of a Matter which can exist
by itself is an inference: is it a reasonable one?
2. No. For all that we know about Matter implies Mind.
This is obvious as to secondary qualities (colour,
sound, etc.); but it is no less true of primary
qualities (solidity, magnitude, etc.). Relations,
no less than sensations, imply Mind, . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. This is the great discovery of Berkeley, though he did
not adequately distinguish between sensations and
intellectual relations, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. But Matter certainly does not exist merely for _our_
transitory and incomplete knowledge: if it cannot exist
apart from Mind, there must be a universal Mind in which
and for which all things exist, _i.e._ God, . . . . . . . 16
5. But Theism is possible without Idealism. The
impossibility of Materialism has
|