omplete
heterogeneity between consciousness and unconscious matter, considered
as something capable of existing without mind, that it seems utterly
impossible and unthinkable that mind should be simply the product or
attribute of matter. That the ultimate Reality cannot be what we mean
by matter has been admitted by the most naturalistic, {22} and, in the
ordinary sense, anti-religious thinkers--Spinoza, for instance, and
Haeckel, and Herbert Spencer. The question remains, 'Which is the
easier, the more probable, the more reasonable theory--that the
ultimate Reality should be Mind, or that it should be something so
utterly unintelligible and inconceivable to us as a _tertium quid_--a
mysterious Unknown and Unknowable--which is neither mind nor matter?'
For my own part, I see no reason to suppose that our inability to think
of anything which is neither matter nor mind but quite unlike either is
a mere imperfection of human thought. It seems more reasonable to
assume that our inability to think of such a mysterious X is due to
there being no such thing.[7]

Our only way of judging of the Unknown is by the analogy of the known.
It is more probable, surely, that the world known to us should exhibit
something of the characteristics of the Reality from which it is
derived, or of which it forms a manifestation, than that it should
exhibit none of these characteristics. No doubt, if we were to argue
from some small part of our experience, or from the detailed
characteristics of one part of our experience to what is beyond our
experience; if, for instance {23} (I am here replying to an objection
of Hoeffding's), a blind man were to argue that the world must be
colourless because he sees no colour, or if any of us were to affirm
that in other planets there can be no colours but what we see, no
sensations but what we feel, no mental powers but what we possess, the
inference would be precarious enough. The Anthropomorphist in the
strict sense--the man who thinks that God or the gods must have human
bodies--no doubt renders himself liable to the gibe that, if oxen could
think, they would imagine the gods to be like oxen, and so on. But the
cases are not parallel. We have no difficulty in thinking that in
other worlds there may be colours which we have never seen, or whole
groups of sensation different from our own: we cannot think that any
existence should be neither mind nor matter, but utterly unlike either.
We are not arg