exists in no mind
whatever, and is due to no will whatever--except to the very small extent
to which the processes of physical nature can be consciously directed to
an end by the volitions of men and similarly limited intelligences. As a
whole, the Universe is purposed and willed by no single will or
combination of wills. I confess I do not understand the idea of a
purpose which operates, but is not the purpose of a Mind which is also a
Will. All the considerations upon which I dwelt to show the necessity of
such a Will to account for the Universe which we know, are so many
arguments against Dr. McTaggart's scheme. The events of Dr. McTaggart's
Universe are, upon the view of Causality which I {101} attempted to
defend in my second lecture, uncaused events.
Nevertheless, as a Philosopher, I am deeply grateful to Dr. McTaggart.
Not only does his scheme on its practical side seem to me preferable to
many systems which sound more orthodox--systems of vague pantheistic
Theism in which Morality is treated as mere 'appearance' and personal
Immortality deliberately rejected--but it has done much intellectually to
clear the air. Dr. McTaggart seems to me right in holding that, if God
or the Absolute is to include in itself all other spirits, and yet the
personality or self-consciousness of those spirits is not to be denied,
then this Absolute in which they are to be included cannot reasonably be
thought of as a conscious being, or invested with the other attributes
usually implied by the term God.
And this leads me to say a few words more in explanation of my own view
of the relation between God and human or other souls. To me, as I have
already intimated, it seems simply meaningless to speak of one
consciousness as included in another consciousness. The essence of a
consciousness is to be for itself: whether it be a thought, a feeling, or
an emotion, the essence of that consciousness is what it is for me.
Every moment of consciousness is unique. Another being may have a {102}
similar feeling: in that case there are two feelings, and not one.
Another mind may know what I feel, but the knowledge of another's agony
is (fortunately) a very different thing from the agony itself. It is
fashionable in some quarters to ridicule the idea of 'impenetrable'
souls. If 'impenetrable' means that another soul cannot know what goes
on in my soul, I do not assert that the soul is impenetrable. I believe
that God knows what occurs
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