haracter.
From an intellectual point such a way of looking at the Universe might be
more intelligent or intelligible than that of pure Materialism or pure
Agnosticism; but morally and religiously I don't know that, when its
consequences are fully realized, it is any great improvement upon either
of them.[1] {31} Moreover, even intellectually it fails to satisfy the
demand which most reflecting people feel, that the world shall be
regarded as a Unity of some kind. If God is thought of as linked by some
inexplicable fate to a Nature over which He has no sort of control--not
so much control as a mere human being who can produce limited changes in
the world,--we can hardly be said to have reduced the world to a Unity.
The old Dualism has broken out again: after all we still have God and the
world confronting one another; neither of them is in any way explained by
the other. Still less could such a world be supposed to have a purpose
or rational end. For our own mere intellectual satisfaction as well as
for the satisfaction of our religious needs we must go on to ask whether
we are not justified in thinking of God as the Cause or Creator of the
world, as well as the Thinker of it.

This enquiry introduces us to the whole problem of Causality. The sketch
which I gave you last time of Bishop Berkeley's argument was a very
imperfect one. Bishop Berkeley was from one point of view a great
philosophic iconoclast, though he destroyed only that he might build up.
He destroyed the superstition of a self-existing matter: {32} he also
waged war against what I will venture to call the kindred superstition of
a mysterious causal nexus between the physical antecedent and the
physical consequent. On this side his work was carried on by Hume.
Berkeley resolved our knowledge into a succession of 'ideas.' He did, no
doubt, fall into the mistake of treating our knowledge as if it were a
mere succession of feelings: he ignored far too much--though he did not
do so completely--that other element in our knowledge, the element of
intellectual relation, of which I said something last time. Here, no
doubt, Berkeley has been corrected by Kant; and, so far, practically all
modern Idealists will own their indebtedness to Kant. Even in the
apprehension of a succession of ideas, in the mere recognition that this
feeling comes after that, there is an element which cannot be explained
by mere feeling. The apprehension that this feeling came after