mind? As
it seems to me, the suggestion is meaningless. Relatedness only has a
meaning when thought of in connection with a mind which is capable of
grasping or holding together both terms of the relation. The relation
between point A and point B is not _in_ point A or _in_ point B taken
by themselves. It is all in the 'between': 'betweenness' from its very
nature cannot exist in any one point of space or in several isolated
points of space or things in space; it must exist only in some one
existent which holds together and connects those points. And nothing,
as far as we can understand, can do that except a mind. Apart from
mind there can be no relatedness: apart from relatedness no space:
apart from space no matter. It follows that apart from mind there can
be no matter.

It will probably be known to all of you that the {12} first person to
make this momentous inference was Bishop Berkeley. There was, indeed,
an obscure medieval schoolman, hardly recognized by the historians of
Philosophy, one Nicholas of Autrecourt, Dean of Metz,[3] who
anticipated him in the fourteenth century, and other better-known
schoolmen who approximated to the position; and there are, of course,
elements in the teaching of Plato and even of Aristotle, or possible
interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, which point in the same
direction. But full-blown Idealism, in the sense which involves a
denial of the independent existence of matter, is always associated
with the name of Bishop Berkeley.

I can best make my meaning plain to you by quoting a passage or two
from his _Principles of Human Knowledge_, in which he extends to the
primary qualities of matter the analysis which Locke had already
applied to the secondary.

'But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances
may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of
bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must
know it by Sense or by Reason.--As for our senses, by them we have the
knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are
immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will; but they do
not inform us that things exist {13} without the mind, or unperceived,
like to those which are perceived. This the Materialists themselves
acknowledge.--It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all
of external things, it must be by Reason inferring their existence from
what is immediately perceived