tised the natural sciences; and the
two works here given, "the Ethics" and "Politics," have
profoundly influenced ethical and political thought from his
own day to ours. In particular, his classification of the
virtues, and his doctrine that virtue lies in a "mean," have
dominated a vast amount of moral speculation. The treatises as
we know them are so crabbed and condensed in style as to give
the impression that they are to a large extent not the
finished works, but notes and summaries.

_I.--THE END OF LIFE AND THE MEANING OF VIRTUE_

Every art and science, every action, has for its end some good, whether
this be a form of activity or an actual product. The ends of minor arts
are only means to the ends of superior arts. If there is one supreme
end, this is The Good, inquiry into which belongs to the supreme Social
Science [for which the Greek term is Politics]. The name given to this
supreme good, the attainment of which is the object of Politics, is
Happiness, good living, or welfare.

But Happiness itself is variously defined; some identify it with
Pleasure, others with Honour--the first a degrading, and the second an
inadequate view. Platonists find it in an abstract Idea of Good, a
Universal which precludes particulars. There is a great deal to be said
against this doctrine, even as a question of logic or metaphysic; but
apart from that, the theory is out of court, for the all sufficient
reason that its practical value is _nil_--knowledge of the great
Universal Good in the abstract is of no practical use whatever in
everyday life, which is a fundamental point for us.

If, then, there is a supreme dominating Good to be aimed at, what are
the essential characteristics it must display? The Good of all Goods,
the Best, must be complete in itself, a consummation. Whatsoever is a
means to some end beyond fails so far of completeness; when we say that
our end must be "complete," it follows that it must always be an end,
never a means. It is not merely one amongst others of which it is the
best, but the one in which all the others are summed up. It is of itself
quite sufficient for the individual, and that not merely in isolation,
but as a member of society--which it is his nature to be.

Let us then define Happiness as Man's _Work_--the performance of his
function as man. Everything has some specific function, the performance
of which is its Good, and man, too, must have a