al, or the
locality. Whereas prudence is concerned precisely with these; it is
essentially practical. Wisdom cannot be identified with statesmanship;
which, again, is not the same as prudence--which applies to the self,
and to the family, as well as to the State; it differs from wisdom as
requiring experience.

Wisdom, knowledge of the ultimate bases, is equally without practical
bearing for those who have acquired a right habit and for those who have
not; just as a knowledge of medical theory is of no use to the average
man. But being an activity of the soul, _ipso facto_, it conduces to
happiness. The general conclusion is that what we have called "prudence"
shows the means to the end which the moral virtues aim at. It is not a
moral virtue, but the moral virtues accord with it. Both are necessary
to the achievement of goodness.

We come now to a second group of qualities, concerned with conduct. We
have dealt with the virtues and their opposing vices. We pass by the
infra-human and the supra-human bestiality and holiness; but have still
to deal with Continence and its contrasted qualities, which are
concerned with the passions.

In the popular view, continence, self-control, is adherence to our
formed judgment. Incontinence is yielding to passion where we know it to
be wrong, and may be indulged in the pursuit of vengeance, honour, or
gain. A number of _prima facie_ contradictions are started out of the
popular views. We find that a man does not act against complete
knowledge or knowledge of which he is fully conscious. The knowledge
may, so to speak, be there, but is in abeyance, a condition which is
palpably exemplified in a drunken man. Now, incontinence is concerned
with pleasures, which are necessary--as for sustenance of life--and
unnecessary but, _per se_, desirable, as honour. Incontinence is a term
applied only by analogy in the case of the latter; its proper
concern--as with the moral vice, which we call intemperance--is with the
former. It implies, however, violent desire, which intemperance does
not. We have examples of such desires in a morbid or diseased form,
species of mania; but here again the term incontinence is only applied
by analogy. Its legitimate application, in short, is restricted to the
normal.

Incontinence in respect of anger is not so bad as in respect of desire.
It is often constitutional, it is in itself painful, and it is not
wanton, being in all three points unlike the other. Wh