s between vulgar ostentation and
niggardliness. It is possible only for the wealthy, and is concerned
mainly with public works, but also with private occasions of ceremony.
The error of vulgar ostentation is misdirection of expenditure, not
excess. Niggardliness abstains from a proper expenditure.

Magnanimity is the virtue of the aristocrat; its excess is
self-glorification, its deficiency self-depreciation. The magnanimous
man will bate nothing of his claim to honour, power and wealth, not as
caring greatly for them, but as demanding what he knows to be his due.
This character involves the possession of the virtues; the man must act
in the grand manner and on the grand scale. He knows his own
superiority, does not conceal it, and acts up to it. Self-glorification
overrates its own capacities; self-depreciation underrates them and
shuns its responsibilities, being the more reprehensible of the two.

There is a nameless virtue which stands to magnanimity in the same
relation as that of liberality to munificence; these being concerned
with honours, as those with money. The excess is ambition, the
deficiency is the lack of it; but here terminology fails us.

Good temper is a mean between ill-temper--whether of the irascible, the
sulky, or the cantankerous kind--and something for which we have no name
(poor-spiritedness). Friendliness comes between the excessive desire to
please and boorishness. It is a social virtue which might be defined as
goodwill _plus_ tact. Sincerity [there is no English term quite
corresponding to the Greek] is the quality opposed on the one side to
boastfulness, and on the other to mock-modesty; it is displayed by the
man who acknowledges, but who never exaggerates his own merits. In the
social display of wit and humour, there is a marked mean between the
buffoon and the dullard or prig. Shame is a term implying a feeling
rather than a habit; like fear, it has a physical effect, producing
blushes, and seems, in fact, to be fear of disrepute. To the young, it
is a safeguard against vice; the virtuous man need never feel it; to be
unable to feel it implies the habit of vice. Continence is not properly
in the category of moral virtues.

_III.--JUSTICE_

We come now to Justice. A specific habit differs from a specific faculty
or science, as each of the latter covers opposites, _e.g._, the science
of health is also the science of sickness; whereas the habit of Justice
does not cover but is opp