I
called it up in the Senate and made quite an extended speech,
explaining its provisions, and urging its ratification. The session
was to close on March 4, and it finally became manifest that it
would be hopeless to attempt to ratify it before that day, and the
effort was abandoned. President Roosevelt called a special session
of the Senate after the fourth of March, when there would be nothing
for the Senate to consider except the Colombian treaty and other
executive matters. According to the usual rule, the treaty was
referred back to the committee, at the beginning of the special
session, and the subject was again gone over in committee as if
there had been no proceedings on it at all during the regular
session. The proposed agreement was finally reported to the Senate,
and ratified. There is no need for me to go over the story of its
rejection by Colombia. The action of the Colombian Congress was
a hold-up pure and simple, and the treaty was rejected in the hope
that the United States would offer a greater amount for the right-
of-way. Panama promptly seceded, which she had a perfect right to
do. Many people have charged that the Roosevelt Administration
actually incited the revolution. Whether this is true or not, I
do not know. I contended at the time, and still believe, that it
is not true. I hope it is not; but the correspondence did show
that the State Department had pretty close knowledge of events
which were occurring on the Isthmus, and had seen to it that there
was a sufficient naval force in the vicinity "to protect American
interests." It was a remarkable revolution--I think the most
remarkable I have ever read of in history. It was practically
bloodless. One or two shots were fired, a Chinaman was killed,
and yet a new and independent republic entered the family of
Nations.

We were able to make with Panama a much more satisfactory treaty
than we had with Colombia. Senator Morgan this time was assisted
by most of his Democratic colleagues; he denounced the treaty and
made all sorts of charges against the Administration; but after
numerous long sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I
was authorized to report it to the Senate with certain minor
amendments, which, in my opening speech, I asked the Senate to
reject, and to ratify the treaty without amendment. I did this at
the earnest insistence of the State Department. And, in addition,
I did not think that the amendments wer