tion which says that the
President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate to make treaties. No law of Congress can in any way
modify or limit those powers. The Dingley Law can not limit the
time in which we shall be allowed to make a treaty; it can not give
to Congress any power on the subject of treaties not given it by
the Constitution, and under the Constitution Congress as a legislative
body is not a part of the treaty-making power."

I contended that the fourth section of the Dingley Act, if considered
by the Executive at all, should be merely as an expression of the
views of Congress in the adjustment of the specific terms of each
treaty.

But the particular question in which I was more interested and to
which I devoted most of my remarks was, whether a reciprocity
treaty, which by its terms provides that the duties to be collected
after its ratification shall be those specified in the treaty, and
none other (and which makes no reference to further Congressional
action), would of its own force operate to repeal so much of the
tariff act as may come in conflict with it, or whether it would be
necessary for Congress to act on a treaty before those duties are
reduced, and before the treaty shall become the supreme law of the
land.

I then proceeded to a minute examination into the history of the
treaty-making provision in the Constitution, tracing it through
the Constitutional Convention, and giving the views of the framers
of the Constitution as to its scope and effect. It was Alexander
Hamilton who drafted the treaty-making clause of the Federal
Constitution, and it was purposely so framed as to exclude the
House from all consideration of treaties. Twice it was proposed
in the Constitutional Convention to unite the House of Representatives
with the Senate in the approval of treaties, but both times it was
rejected almost unanimously, Pennsylvania alone voting in the
affirmative. The treaty-making clause of the Federal Constitution
was adopted in the Constitutional Convention only after a most
vigorous fight against it by those who contended that the authority
conferred was too great. Patrick Henry thought that, "If the clause
were adopted as it was submitted to the State, two-thirds of a
quorum of the Senate would be empowered to make treaties that might
relinquish and alienate territorial rights and our most valuable
commercial advantages. In short, should anything be left,