ves the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then
readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting
till then because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it
appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and
distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth
of that proposition upon the same ground and by the same means, that he
knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon
the same ground also that he may come to know afterwards "That it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," as shall be more
fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to
have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the
signification of those generic terms that stand for them; or to put
together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be
before he comes to assent to those maxims;--whose terms, with the ideas
they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel he
must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and
then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon
the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in
his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is
expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows
that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same
self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a
child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of
reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen nineteen, and
thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are
signified by one, two, and three.

17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not
innate.

This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of
reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those
supposed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and
learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those
they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as
proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men,
even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to
these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate.
For, since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to