the joint forces of Pope, McClellan, and
probably another corps from Washington: the whole well fed, well
armed, and certainly more than twice as strong as the united
Confederates. But Jackson and Stuart multiplied their forces by
skillful maneuvers and mystifying raids, and presently Stuart had
his revenge for the affront he had suffered on the seventeenth.
On the tempestuous night of the twenty-second he captured Pope's
dispatches. On the twenty-fourth, at Jefferson, Lee and Jackson
discussed the situation with these dispatches before them. Dr.
Hunter McGuire, the Confederate staff-surgeon, noticed that Jackson
was unusually animated, drawing curves in the sand with the toe
of his boot while Lee nodded assent. Perhaps it was Jackson who
suggested the strategic idea of that wonderful last week in August.
However that may have been, Lee alone was responsible for its adoption
and superior direction.
With a marvelous insight into the characters of his opponents,
a consummate knowledge of the science and art of war, and--quite
as important--an exact appreciation of the risks worth running,
Lee actually divided his 55,000 men in face of Pope's 80,000, of
20,000 more at Washington and Aquia, and of 50,000 available
reinforcements. Then, by the well-deserved results obtained, he
became one of the extremely few really great commanders of all
time.
The "bookish theorick" who, with all the facts before him, revels
in the fond delights of retrospective prophecy, will never understand
how Lee succeeded in this enterprise, except by sheer good luck.
Only those who themselves have groped their perilous way through
the dense, distorting fog of war can understand the application
of that knowledge, genius, and character for war which so rarely
unite in one man.
Lee sent Jackson north, to march at utmost speed under cover of
the Bull Run Mountains, to cross them at Thoroughfare Gap, and
to cut Pope's line at Manassas, where the enormous Federal field
base had been established. Unknown to Pope, Longstreet then slipped
into Jackson's place, so as to keep Pope in play till the raid on
Manassas and threat against Washington would draw him northeast,
away from McClellan at Aquia. The final move of this profound,
though very daring, plan was to take advantage of the Federal
distractions and consequent dispersions so as to effect a junction
on the field of battle against a conquerable force.
Jackson moved off by the first gray strea
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