he only safety was unceasing care,
even in cases vouched for by civilians of high official standing.
When Grant was beginning the great campaign of '64 the Honorable
Elihu B. Washburne, afterwards United States Minister to France,
introduced one Swinton as the prospective historian of the war. On
this understanding Swinton accompanied the army. One night Grant
gave verbal orders to the staff officer on duty. Three days later
these orders appeared in a Richmond paper. Shortly afterwards, in
the midst of the Wilderness battle, Swinton was found eavesdropping
behind a stump during a midnight conference at headquarters. Sent
off with a serious warning, he next appeared, in another place, as
a prisoner condemned to death for spying. Grant, satisfied that
he was not bent on getting news for the enemy in particular, but
only for the press in general, released and expelled him with such
a warning this time that he never once came back.
The Union forces at the front were about twice the corresponding
forces of the South. Sherman, who commanded the river armies after
Grant's transfer to Virginia, says: "I always estimated my force at
about double, and could afford to lose two to one without disturbing
our relative proportion." In Virginia the Army of the Potomac under
Meade and the new Army of the James under Butler, both under Grant's
immediate command, totaled over a hundred and fifty thousand men
against the ninety thousand under Lee. These odds of five to three
remained the same when a hundred and ten thousand Federals went
into winter quarters against sixty-six thousand Confederates at
Petersburg. But, when the naval odds of more than ten to one in
favor of the North are added in, the general odds of two to one are
reached on this as well as other scenes of action. In reserves the
odds were very much greater; for while the South was getting down
to its last available man the North began the following year with
nearly one million in the forces and two millions on the registered
reserve. Thus, even supposing that half the reserves were unfit for
active service, the man-power odds against the South were these:
two to one in arms at the beginning of the great campaign, five to
one at the end of it, and ten to one if the fit reserves were all
included. The odds in transportation by land, and very much more
so by water, were even greater at corresponding times; while the
odds in all the other resources which could be turned to
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