rant tomorrow." Lee also telegraphed direct to Davis
for immediate reinforcements, which arrived only just in time for
the terrific battle of Cold Harbor.

With these three advantages, in addition to the other odds in his
favor, Grant seemed to have found the tide of fortune at the flood
in the latter part of May. But he had many troubles of his own.
No sooner had half his army been badly defeated on the eighteenth
than news came that Sigel was in full retreat instead of cutting
off supplies from Lee. Then came news of Butler's retreat from
Drewry's Bluff, close in to Richmond. Nor was this all; for it was
only now that definite news of the Red River Expedition arrived
to confirm Grant's worst suspicions and ruin his second plan of
helping Farragut to take Mobile. But, as was his wont, Grant at
once took steps to meet the crisis. He ordered Hunter to replace
Sigel and go south--straight into the heart of the Valley, asked the
navy to move his own base down the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg
to Port Royal, and then himself marched on toward Richmond, where
Lee was desperately trying to concentrate for battle.

The two armies were now drawing all available force together round
the strategic center of Cold Harbor, only nine miles east of Richmond.
On the thirty-first Sheridan drove out the enemy detachments there,
and was himself about to retire before much superior reinforcements
when he got Grant's order to hold his ground at any cost. Nightfall
prevented a general assault till the next morning, when Sheridan
managed to stand fast till Wright's whole corps came up and the
enemy at once desisted. But elsewhere the Confederates did what
they could to stave the Federals off from advantageous ground on
that day and the next. The day after--the fateful third of June--the
two sides closed in death-grips at Cold Harbor.

On this, the thirtieth day of Grant's campaign of stern attrition
and would-be-smashing hammer-strokes at Lee, these were his orders
for attack: "The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot
succeed, suspend the offensive. But when one does succeed, push it
vigorously, and, if necessary, pile in troops at the successful
point from wherever they can be taken." The trouble was that Grant
was two days late in carrying on the battle so well begun by Sheridan,
that Warren's corps was two miles off and entirely disconnected,
and that the three remaining corps formed three parts and no whole
when the str