but
what was really Longstreet's left. Meanwhile the Centreville troops
attacked near Bull Run. But that dashing commander, Philip Kearny,
was held up by Jackson's concentrated guns; so Hooker and Reno
advanced alone, straight for the railroad line. The Confederates
behind it poured in a tremendous hail of bullets, and the long
dry grass caught fire. But nothing stopped Hooker till bayonets
were crossed on the rails and the Confederate line was broken. Then
the Confederate reserves charged in and drove the Federals back.
No sooner was this seen than, with a burst of cheering, another
blue line surged forward. Again the Confederate front was broken,
but again their reserves drove back the Federals. And so the fight
went on, with stroke and counterstroke, till, at a quarter past
five, twelve hours after Pope's first men had started from the
Henry Hill, his thirty thousand attackers found themselves unable
to break through.
Pope wished to make one more effort to round up Jackson's supposedly
open right. But Porter quite properly sent back word that it was
far too strong for his own ten thousand. In reply Pope angrily
ordered an immediate attack. But it was now too dark, and the battle
ended for the day.
Strangely enough, Lee was also having trouble with his subordinate
on the same flank at the same time, but with this difference, that
Porter was right while Longstreet was wrong. Lee saw his chance of
rolling up Pope's left and ordered Longstreet to do it. But, after
reconnoitering the ground, Longstreet came back to say the chance
was "not inviting." Again Lee ordered an attack. But Longstreet
wasted time, looking for needlessly favorable ground till long after
dark. Meanwhile the Federals were also feeling their way forward
over the same ground to get into a good flanking position for next
day's battle. So the two sides met; and it was past midnight when
Longstreet settled down. Lee wanted a sword thrust. Longstreet gave
a pin prick. We shall meet Longstreet again, in the same character
of obstructive subordinate, at Gettysburg. But he was, for the
most part, a very good officer indeed; and the South, with its
scanty supply of trained leaders, could not afford to make changes
like the North. The fault, too, was partly Lee's; for his one weak
point with good but wayward subordinates was a tendency to let his
sensitive consideration for their feelings overcome his sterner
insight into their defects.
At noon on the
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