gence
continually updates the inventory of knowledge; and estimative
intelligence revises overall interpretations of country and issue
prospects for guidance of basic and current intelligence. The World
Factbook, The President's Daily Brief, and the National Intelligence
Estimates are examples of the three types of finished intelligence.

The United States has carried on foreign intelligence activities since
the days of George Washington, but only since World War II have they
been coordinated on a governmentwide basis. Three programs have
highlighted the development of coordinated basic intelligence since
that time: (1) the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), (2)
the National Intelligence Survey (NIS), and (3) The World Factbook.

During World War II, intelligence consumers realized that the
production of basic intelligence by different components of the US
Government resulted in a great duplication of effort and conflicting
information. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 brought home
to leaders in Congress and the executive branch the need for
integrating departmental reports to national policymakers. Detailed
coordinated information was needed not only on such major powers as
Germany and Japan, but also on places of little previous interest. In
the Pacific Theater, for example, the Navy and Marines had to launch
amphibious operations against many islands about which information was
unconfirmed or nonexistent. Intelligence authorities resolved that the
United States should never again be caught unprepared.

In 1943, Gen. George B. Strong (G-2), Adm. H. C. Train (Office of Naval
Intelligence--ONI), and Gen. William J. Donovan (Director of the Office
of Strategic Services--OSS) decided that a joint effort should be
initiated. A steering committee was appointed on 27 April 1943 that
recommended the formation of a Joint Intelligence Study Publishing
Board to assemble, edit, coordinate, and publish the Joint Army Navy
Intelligence Studies (JANIS). JANIS was the first interdepartmental
basic intelligence program to fulfill the needs of the US Government
for an authoritative and coordinated appraisal of strategic basic
intelligence. Between April 1943 and July 1947, the board published 34
JANIS studies. JANIS performed well in the war effort, and numerous
letters of commendation were received, including a statement from Adm.
Forrest Sherman, Chief of Staff, Pacific Ocean Areas, which said,
"JANIS has bec