R, NEA, NSG, OAS
(observer), OECD, OPCW, OSCE (partner), PCA, UN, UN Security Council
(temporary), UNCTAD, UNDOF, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNRWA,
UNU, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO, ZC

Diplomatic representation in the US:
chief of mission: Ambassador Kunihiko SAITO
chancery: 2520 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
consulate(s) general: Hagatna (Guam), Anchorage, Atlanta, Boston,
Chicago, Detroit, Honolulu, Houston, Kansas City (Missouri), Los
Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Portland (Oregon), San
Francisco, and Seattle
consulate(s): Saipan (Northern Mariana Islands)

Diplomatic representation from the US:
chief of mission: Ambassador Thomas S. FOLEY
embassy: 10-5, Akasaka 1-chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8420
mailing address: Unit 45004, Box 258, APO AP 96337-5004
consulate(s) general: Naha (Okinawa), Osaka-Kobe, Sapporo
consulate(s): Fukuoka, Nagoya

Flag description: white with a large red disk (representing the
sun without rays) in the center

Economy

Economy--overview: Government-industry cooperation, a strong work
ethic, mastery of high technology, and a comparatively small defense
allocation (1% of GDP) have helped Japan advance with extraordinary
rapidity to the rank of second most powerful economy in the world.
One notable characteristic of the economy is the working together of
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors in closely knit groups
called keiretsu. A second basic feature has been the guarantee of
lifetime employment for a substantial portion of the urban labor
force; this guarantee is eroding. Industry, the most important
sector of the economy, is heavily dependent on imported raw
materials and fuels. The much smaller agricultural sector is highly
subsidized and protected, with crop yields among the highest in the
world. Usually self-sufficient in rice, Japan must import about 50%
of its requirements of other grain and fodder crops. Japan maintains
one of the world's largest fishing fleets and accounts for nearly
15% of the global catch. For three decades overall real economic
growth had been spectacular: a 10% average in the 1960s, a 5%
average in the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 1980s. Growth slowed
markedly in 1992-95 largely because of the aftereffects of
overinvestment during the late 1980s and contractionary domestic
policies intended to wring speculative excesses from the st