n, or lust
of blood or pride of opinion, or wanton exercise of power, but sense
of duty, and they but represented what was universal public opinion
from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries."[1]

[1] Lea, op. cit., vol. i, p. 234.

It was, therefore, the spirit of the times, the _Zeitgeist_, as we
would call it to-day, that was responsible for the rigorous measures
formerly used by both Church and State in the suppression of heresy.
The other reasons we have mentioned are only subsidiary. This is the
one reason that satisfactorily explains both the theories and the
facts.

But an explanation is something far different from a defence of an
institution. To explain is to show the relation of cause to effect;
to defend is to show that the effect corresponds to an ideal of
justice. Even if we grant that the procedure of the Inquisition did
correspond to a certain ideal of justice, that ideal is certainly not
ours to-day. Let us go into this question more thoroughly.

It is obvious that we must strongly denounce all the abuses of the
Inquisition that were due to the sins of individuals, no matter what
their source. No one, for instance, would dream of defending Cauchon,
the iniquitous judge of Joan of Arc, or other cruel Inquisitors who,
like him, used their authority to punish unjustly suspects brought
before their tribunal. From this standpoint, it is probable that many
of the sentences of the Inquisition need revision.

But can we rightly consider this institution "a sublime spectacle of
social perfection," and "a model of justice?"[1]

[1] The _Civilta Cattolica_, 1853, vol. i. p. 595 seq.

To call the Inquisition a model of justice is a manifest
exaggeration, as every fair student of its history must admit.

The Inquisitorial procedure was, in itself, inferior to the
_accusatio_, in which the accuser assumed the burden of publicly
proving his charges. That it was difficult to observe this method of
procedure in heresy trials can readily be understood; for the _poena
talionis_ awaiting the accuser who failed to substantiate his charges
was calculated to cool the ardor of many Catholics, who otherwise
would have been eager to prosecute heretics. But we must grant that
the _accusatio_ in criminal law allowed a greater chance for justice
to be done than the _inquisitio_. Besides, if the ecclesiastical
_inquisitio_ had proceeded like the civil _inquisitio_, the
possibility of judicial errors might have been f