lishmen in the Transvaal that evoked in
1881, and again evoked in 1896, a political opposition between the
races. Fortunately, the sentiments of the Dutch have possessed a safe
outlet in the colonial Parliament. The wisdom of the policy which gave
responsible government has been signally vindicated; for, as
constitutional means have existed for influencing the British
Government, feelings which might otherwise have found vent in a revolt
or a second secession have been diverted into a safe channel.

The other set of race troubles, those between white settlers and the
aborigines of the land have been graver in South Africa than any which
European governments have had to face in any other new country. The Red
Men of North America, splendidly as they fought, never seriously checked
the advance of the whites. The revolts of the aborigines in Peru and
Central America were easily suppressed. The once warlike Maoris of New
Zealand have, under the better methods of the last twenty-five years,
become quiet and tolerably contented. Even the French in Algeria had
not so long a strife to maintain with the Moorish and Kabyle tribes as
the Dutch and English had with the natives at the Cape. The south-coast
Kafirs far outnumbered the whites, were full of courage, had a rough and
thickly wooded country to defend, and were so ignorant as never to know
when they were beaten. A more intelligent race might have sooner
abandoned the contest. The melancholy chapter of native wars seems to be
now all but closed, except perhaps in the far north. These wars,
however, did much to retard the progress of South Africa and to give it
a bad name. They deterred many an English farmer from emigrating thither
in the years between 1810 and 1870. They annoyed and puzzled the home
government, and made it think the Colony a worthless possession, whence
little profit or credit was to be drawn in return for the unending
military expenditure. And they gave the colonists ground for complaints,
sometimes just, sometimes unjust, against the home government, which was
constantly accused of parsimony, of shortsightedness, of vacillation, of
sentimental weakness, in sending out too few troops, in refusing to
annex fresh territory, in patching up a hollow peace, in granting too
easy terms to the natives.

Whoever reviews the whole South African policy of the British Government
during the ninety-three years that have elapsed since 1806 cannot but
admit that many erro