successful, the enemy's communications would be cut off. In the
meantime the Mexicans were busily engaged in greatly strengthening
their positions.

General Scott had not intended to attack the enemy in the absence of
Worth's division, which had not yet arrived. A movement of Lieutenant
Franklin Gardner, re-enforced later by the mounted rifles under Major
Edwin Vose Sumner and a battalion of the First Artillery under
Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, to occupy a position near the base of the
Atalaya, provoked a sharp conflict. General Santa Anna, being at the
front, ordered re-enforcements. Colonel Thomas Childs withdrew, having
advanced under a misapprehension. The American loss was ninety-seven,
killed and wounded. General Scott returned to Plan del Rio and issued
the following order:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"PLAN DEL RIO, _April 17, 1847_.

"GENERAL ORDERS NO. 111.

"The enemy's whole line of intrenchments and batteries will be
attacked in front, and at the same time turned, early in the day
to-morrow, probably before ten o'clock A.M. The second (Twiggs's)
division of regulars is already advanced within easy turning
distance toward the enemy's line. That division has instructions to
move forward before daylight to-morrow and take up position across
the national road, in the enemy's rear, so as to cut off a retreat
toward Jalapa. It may be re-enforced to-day, if unexpectedly
attacked in force, by regiments--one or two--taken from Shields's
brigade of volunteers. If not, the two volunteer regiments will
march for that purpose at daylight to-morrow morning under
Brigadier-General Shields, who will report to Brigadier-General
Twiggs in getting up with him, or to the general in chief if he be
in advance. The remaining regiments of that volunteer brigade will
receive instructions in the course of this day. The first division
of regulars (Worth's) will follow the movement against the enemy's
left at sunrise to-morrow morning. As already arranged,
Brigadier-General Pillow's brigade will march at six o'clock
to-morrow morning along the route he has carefully reconnoitered,
and stand ready, as soon as he hears the report of arms on our
right, or sooner, if circumstances should favor him, to pierce the
enemy's line of batteries at such point--the nearer the river the
better--as he may select. Once in the rear of that l