ns have plenty of other land in their empire, and
can import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an
insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a
fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For
unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues
which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster. Meanwhile
our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it be the
opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by the
fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of their
lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children;
so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their
land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war.
"Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure
your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but I do bid
you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with
them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive
of submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our own
preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies,
Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession
to our strength naval or pecuniary--I say Hellenic or barbarian, because
the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of
the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of
self-preservation--and secondly the development of our home resources.
If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after
the lapse of two or three years our position will have become materially
strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think proper. Perhaps
by that time the sight of our preparations, backed by language equally
significant, will have disposed them to submission, while their land
is still untouched, and while their counsels may be directed to the
retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For the only light in which
you can view their land is that of a hostage in your hands, a hostage
the more valuable the better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare
as long as possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the
difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, hurried
away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it waste,
have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity upon
Pelo
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