But we are not yet by any means
so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly, while it
is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve
the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our differences settled
by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who
heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin hostilities, whatever line
of action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in repelling
you."

Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard
the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the observations
of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on
the question before them. The opinions of the majority all led to the
same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be
declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward,
who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a moderate man, and
made the following speech:

"I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the
experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as
myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for
war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety.
This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of the
greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a
struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same
character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different points.
But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also
an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest
state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and
public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population
such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number
of tributary allies--what can justify us in rashly beginning such a
struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is
it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if we are to practise and
become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There
we have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury,
nor are we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Confidence
might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and
population, which will enable us to invade and devastate their lands.
But the Athenia