FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269  
270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   >>   >|  
mplicity as a feeling, nature must always have the upper hand, and art succumb to her. Until we have established this distinction we can only form an incomplete idea of simplicity. The affections are also something natural, and the rules of decency are artificial; yet the triumph of the affections over decency is anything but simple. But when affection triumphs over artifice, over false decency, over dissimulation, we shall have no difficulty in applying the word simple to this. Nature must therefore triumph over art, not by its blind and brutal force as a dynamical power, but in virtue of its form as a moral magnitude; in a word, not as a want, but as an internal necessity. It must not be insufficiency, but the inopportune character of the latter that gives nature her victory; for insufficiency is only a want and a defect, and nothing that results from a want or defect could produce esteem. No doubt in the simplicity resulting from surprise, it is always the predominance of affection and a want of reflection that causes us to appear natural. But this want and this predominance do not by any means suffice to constitute simplicity; they merely give occasion to nature to obey without let or hinderance her moral constitution, that is, the law of harmony. The simplicity resulting from surprise can only be encountered in man and that only in as far as at the moment he ceases to be a pure and innocent nature. This sort of simplicity implies a will that is not in harmony with that which nature does of her own accord. A person simple after this fashion, when recalled to himself, will be the first to be alarmed at what he is; on the other hand, a person in whom simplicity is found as a feeling, will only wonder at one thing, that is, at the way in which men feel astonishment. As it is not the moral subject as a person, but only his natural character set free by affection, that confesses the truth, it follows from this that we shall not attribute this sincerity to man as a merit, and that we shall be entitled to laugh at it, our raillery not being held in check by any personal esteem for his character. Nevertheless, as it is still the sincerity of nature which, even in the simplicity caused by surprise, pierces suddenly through the veil of dissimulation, a satisfaction of a superior order is mixed with the mischievous joy we feel in having caught any one in the act. This is because nature, opposed to affectation, and truth, opp
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   245   246   247   248   249   250   251   252   253   254   255   256   257   258   259   260   261   262   263   264   265   266   267   268   269  
270   271   272   273   274   275   276   277   278   279   280   281   282   283   284   285   286   287   288   289   290   291   292   293   294   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

nature

 

simplicity

 

natural

 

simple

 
decency
 

affection

 

surprise

 

character

 
person
 

defect


feeling
 
insufficiency
 

resulting

 

harmony

 

esteem

 

predominance

 

sincerity

 

affections

 

triumph

 

dissimulation


affectation
 

caught

 

opposed

 

fashion

 

recalled

 

alarmed

 
accord
 
pierces
 

entitled

 
implies

raillery

 

Nevertheless

 
caused
 

personal

 

suddenly

 
attribute
 
subject
 

astonishment

 

mischievous

 

superior


satisfaction

 

confesses

 

brutal

 
applying
 

Nature

 
dynamical
 

inopportune

 

necessity

 

internal

 
virtue