that the rebels should not take the initiative
in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30
o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his
wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was
fixed as the hour to move.
Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth
with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line
perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was
directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.
Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in
between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in
position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their
front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take
advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside
was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to
swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock
was informed of all the movements ordered.
Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was
sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.
Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his
right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that
notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both
for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before
Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His
purpose was evident, but he failed.
Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time
that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,
thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded
by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by
which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to
attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,
and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about
an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.
I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if
the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen
the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been
taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another
stand
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