t at Washington of the position of
the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the
move I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies
should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train and
guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies moved
around by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent,
through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. This
order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be
landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined
the Army of the Potomac.
It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac
from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.
To accomplish it, I issued the following order:
QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.
MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.
Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and
artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.
Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to
Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.
Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest
commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the
enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow
afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and
seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain
on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and
artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the
division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced
march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.
At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the
5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for
the same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with
Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will
be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their
road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his command
in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it
will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get
all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will
have to take. As soon as th
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