e garrison of
Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of
that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked
them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another
portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in
the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great
loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and
small arms: they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,
with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a few
days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first
at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him
a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from
returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the
Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist
under any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siege
might last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in
a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be
among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface
water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If
Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved
the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of
the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and
officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the
assault. The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so
great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches
after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assault
not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would
have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.
CHAPTER LVI.
LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE
--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF
PETERSBURG.
Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of
the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the
face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move
carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)
Preparations for this
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