mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions
covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to
enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched
into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men
stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but
some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying
the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,
about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were
mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though
Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to
the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that
our men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our
side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that
they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what
moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations
upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded
the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that
our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen
themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the men
running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an
hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our
men in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to
play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements
from his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousand
men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part
of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander
who was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that
most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James
River were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of
infantry and the ca