in
such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads
which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his
new position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,
bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on
furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong
intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made an
assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close
to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during the
progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the
cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.
These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found
that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sherman
had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong
guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty
days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again
at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself
starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the
Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy
possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. The
enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by
flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the
river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics
prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston
was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much
favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the
people of that section of the South in which he was commanding. The
very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such
circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they
would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything
that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did
finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent
that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a
separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way