ntury
were not better than the systematic treachery of their servile
descendants three hundred years afterwards. The proposition must
therefore be greatly limited; yet we can scarcely hesitate to admit,
upon a comprehensive view, that there were several changes during the
last four of the middle ages, which must naturally have tended to
produce, and some of which did unequivocally produce, a meliorating
effect, within the sphere of their operation, upon the moral character
of society.

[Sidenote: Elevation of the lower ranks.]

The first and perhaps the most important of these, was the gradual
elevation of those whom unjust systems of polity had long depressed; of
the people itself, as opposed to the small number of rich and noble, by
the abolition or desuetude of domestic and predial servitude, and by the
privileges extended to corporate towns. The condition of slavery is
indeed perfectly consistent with the observance of moral obligations;
yet reason and experience will justify the sentence of Homer, that he
who loses his liberty loses half his virtue. Those who have acquired, or
may hope to acquire, property of their own, are most likely to respect
that of others; those whom law protects as a parent are most willing to
yield her a filial obedience; those who have much to gain by the
good-will of their fellow citizens are most interested in the
preservation of an honourable character. I have been led, in different
parts of the present work, to consider these great revolutions in the
order of society under other relations than that of their moral
efficacy; and it will therefore be unnecessary to dwell upon them;
especially as this efficacy is indeterminate, though I think
unquestionable, and rather to be inferred from general reflections than
capable of much illustration by specific facts.

[Sidenote: Police.]

We may reckon in the next place among the causes of moral improvement, a
more regular administration of justice according to fixed laws, and a
more effectual police. Whether the courts of judicature were guided by
the feudal customs or the Roman law, it was necessary for them to
resolve litigated questions with precision and uniformity. Hence a more
distinct theory of justice and good faith was gradually apprehended; and
the moral sentiments of mankind were corrected, as on such subjects they
often require to be, by clearer and better grounded inferences of
reasoning. Again, though it cannot be said that la