he Senate."

_The State_ must appoint, and the appointment must be made _in such
manner_ as _the Legislature_ thereof may direct. Here are the two
elements of a valid appointment, and they must concur. An appointment
not made by the State, or not made in the manner directed by its
Legislature, is no appointment at all.

There must be _State_ action in the _manner_ directed. If, for
example, an appointment were made by a State authority, such as the
Governor, without the sanction of the Legislature, it would be void.
If it were made by the people in mass-convention, but not in a manner
directed by the Legislature, it would be void also. And if, on the
other hand, it were made in such manner as the Legislature had
directed, but not made by the State, it would be equally invalid.
Indeed, the Legislature may itself have given a direction in
contravention of the State constitution, and thus the direction prove
a nullity. So, too, the Legislature may have acted in contravention of
the Federal Constitution, and for that reason its direction may have
been void. The appointing power is the State, the manner of its action
is prescribed by the Legislature; the valid authority and the valid
manner of its exercise must concur, to make a valid appointment.

If, therefore, the persons assuming the office are not appointed _by
the State_, and _in the manner_ directed by the Legislature, they are
not electors; that is to say, they are not electors _de jure_;
electors _de facto_ they can hardly become, since their functions
exist but for a moment, and with one act they perish. What is an
appointment by the State? How can _a State_ appoint? I answer, by the
people, the corporators of the body politic and corporate, or by one
of the departments of its government, as established by its
constitution. The power to appoint cannot be renounced or divested. It
must ever remain in the State, a living power, to be called into
action at each recurring election. It cannot be delegated, except as
the different powers of the State are by its constitution delegated to
its great departments of government. If it were otherwise, it might be
delegated to a foreign prince, and delegated in perpetuity. It is no
answer to say that such a delegation _would_ not be made, the question
is, whether it _could_ be made, without violating the Constitution of
the country? I insist that it could not; and that if the Legislature
of New York were to authorize our frie