ave been exposed to the enemy. It is remarkable that the plan of
the Russian generals was to make the principal attack upon the extreme
left of the British, so as to separate the English left from the French
right. The officer in charge of the attacking column missed his way,
delay was thus caused as well as the plan of assault totally deranged;
possibly, to these circumstances may be attributed the failure of the
Russian attack of the 5th of November.

After this battle, Sir De Lacy Evans strongly recommended Lord Raglan
to change his position. He was influenced in offering this advice by
the total inadequacy of the English army, numerically, to occupy such
extended lines, and by the suffering of the army from ill health,
climate, and deficient supplies, personal and military. This letter of
the general has been much misrepresented in the London clubs, and among
coteries unfriendly to the general's liberal parliamentary policy. It
was, however, the opinion of Sir De Lacy that, unless reinforcements
arrived in numbers far superior to what was then probable, the British
would be unable to hold their ground; and, notwithstanding the actual
issue, such advice was sound, and based upon facts and probabilities.

After the battle of Inkerman, the condition of the British army became
truly horrible, so that the closing winter months of 1854 were such
as tried the fortitude of the British troops and their hardihood of
endurance to the uttermost. It would be in vain to attempt to portray,
upon these pages, sufferings which excited the wonder and sympathy of
all nations, or to depict the patriotism and enduring devotion to duty
by which such protracted miseries were sustained. Great numbers perished
of cold, hunger, and sickness; and the cholera, which ravaged the
encampments of Gallipoli and Varna, pursued the army to the trenches
before Sebastopol. The Russians also suffered much, and bore it as good,
hardy, and loyal soldiers; but they had the shelter, hospitals, and
supplies of the city. The troops on the Tchernaya were relieved by the
garrison of the city, and supplied from its almost exhaustless stores.
The Russian armies had the whole power of the empire in their rear; but,
notwithstanding the herculean efforts made by the czar to recruit and
feed his armies, the drain of life was terrible, from causes similar to
those by which the English were swept away in such numbers. The French
army was far better organized and more h