ed by the people. Although they
are all possible, yet a moment's thought shows that they are of very
different weight: it is hard to conceive, for example, of our turning
the Islands over to England. Excluding, then, cession to any foreign
power, we may roughly arrange the various possibilities in a scale,
as it were: (_a_) absolute retention; (_b_) qualified retention; (_c_)
protectorate; (_d_) neutralization; (_e_) international independence
at some future date; (_f_) immediate international independence. On
examining this list thus arranged, certain deductions appear. The
stated various possibilities are not all independent, nor are they
all exclusive one of the others. Thus (_a_) excludes all the rest, or,
better, implies (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_), and excludes (_a_) and (_f_);
(_b_) and (_c_) between them are not independent, since a qualified
retention may pass into a protectorate. Neutralization not impossibly
may ultimately call for a protectorate. Future, independence, so
long as unaccomplished, implies (_a_), (_b_), (_c_), and (_d_), while
(_f_) is completely exclusive. It may, however, not prevent foreign
absorption, if, once out, we stay out.

We shall not here take up all of these possibilities. Whatever other
conclusion may be reached, the American people must first pass, either
tacitly or explicitly, on retention or independence. If either of these
extreme be selected, the other possibilities go by the board. If both
are rejected, the remaining four will then have their day in court.

Our immediate purpose, then, is to discuss the question with which
this investigation opens, with the definite purpose of suggesting,
if not of reaching, conclusions that may help others in forming a
decision. It is only when individual decisions have so increased in
number as in some sort to form a body of public opinion that future
action, whether for or against independence, is to be expected.

III.

However unjustly the American people may treat its own self in respect
of tariffs and other issues deeply affecting its welfare, it may be
taken for granted, and is so taken here, that in foreign relations the
desire of the people is to do what is right. The right determined,
a duty is imposed. Clearly, then, we must first try to discover in
this case what is right--what is right for us, what is right for the
Islanders. It may be that what is theoretically right, or regarded
as theoretically right, shall turn out to be pr