r the encampment of larger and lesser divisions
and was intersected in various directions by mounds and ditches,
Caesar's right wing along with the cavalry entirely missed its way;
instead of supporting the left in attacking the Pompeian legion,
it got into a narrow trench that led from one of the old camps
towards the river. So Pompeius, who came up in all haste
with five legions to the aid of his troops, found the two wings
of the enemy separated from each other, and one of them
in an utterly forlorn position. When the Caesarians saw him advance,
a panic seized them; the whole plunged into disorderly flight;
and, if the matter ended with the loss of 1000 of the best soldiers
and Caesar's army did not sustain a complete defeat, this was due
simply to the circumstance that Pompeius also could not freely
develop his force on the broken ground, and to the further fact that,
fearing a stratagem, he at first held back his troops.
Consequences of Caesar's Defeats
But, even as it was, these days were fraught with mischief.
Not only had Caesar endured the most serious losses and forfeited
at a blow his entrenchments, the result of four months of gigantic
labour; he was by the recent engagements thrown back again exactly
to the point from which he had set out. From the sea he was
more completely driven than ever, since Pompeius' elder son Gnaeus
had by a bold attack partly burnt, partly carried off, Caesar's
few ships of war lying in the port of Oricum, and had soon afterwards
also set fire to the transport fleet that was left behind in Lissus;
all possibility of bringing up fresh reinforcements to Caesar
by sea from Brundisium was thus lost. The numerous Pompeian cavalry,
now released from their confinement, poured themselves over
the adjacent country and threatened to render the provisioning
of Caesar's army, which had always been difficult, utterly impossible.
Caesar's daring enterprise of carrying on offensive operations
without ships against an enemy in command of the sea and resting
on his fleet had totally failed. On what had hitherto been
the theatre of war he found himself in presence of an impregnable
defensive position, and unable to strike a serious blow either
against Dyrrhachium or against the hostile army; on the other hand
it depended now solely on Pompeius whether he should proceed
to attack under the most favourable circumstances an antagonist
already in grave danger as to his means of subsistence.
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