The war
had arrived at a crisis. Hitherto Pompeius had, to all appearance,
played the game of war without special plan, and only adjusted
his defence according to the exigencies of each attack; and this was
not to be censured, for the protraction of the war gave him opportunity
of making his recruits capable of fighting, of bringing up his reserves,
and of bringing more fully into play the superiority of his fleet
in the Adriatic. Caesar was beaten not merely in tactics
but also in strategy. This defeat had not, it is true,
that effect which Pompeius not without reason expected; the eminent
soldierly energy of Caesar's veterans did not allow matters
to come to an immediate and total breaking up of the army
by hunger and mutiny. But yet it seemed as if it depended solely
on his opponent by judiciously following up his victory
to reap its full fruits.

War Prospects of Pompeius
Scipio and Calvinus

It was for Pompeius to assume the aggressive; and he was resolved
to do so. Three different ways of rendering his victory fruitful
presented themselves to him. The first and simplest was not to desist
from assailing the vanquished army, and, if it departed,
to pursue it. Secondly, Pompeius might leave Caesar himself
and his best troops in Greece, and might cross in person, as he had
long been making preparations for doing, with the main army to Italy,
where the feeling was decidedly antimonarchical and the forces
of Caesar, after the despatch of the best troops and their brave
and trustworthy commandant to the Greek army, would not be
of very much moment. Lastly, the victor might turn inland,
effect a junction with the legions of Metellus Scipio, and attempt
to capture the troops of Caesar stationed in the interior.
The latter forsooth had, immediately after the arrival of the second
freight from Italy, on the one hand despatched strong detachments
to Aetolia and Thessaly to procure means of subsistence for his army,
and on the other had ordered a corps of two legions under Gnaeus
Domitius Calvinus to advance on the Egnatian highway towards Macedonia,
with the view of intercepting and if possible defeating in detail
the corps of Scipio advancing on the same road from Thessalonica.
Calvinus and Scipio had already approached within a few miles
of each other, when Scipio suddenly turned southward and, rapidly
crossing the Haliacmon (Inje Karasu) and leaving his baggage there
under Marcus Favonius, penetrated into Thes