ioned in Brittany and a second in the very unsettled canton
of the Carnutes (near Chartres), the whole Roman army numbering six
legions was encamped in the Belgic territory. The scantiness
of the supplies of grain had induced Caesar to station his troops
farther apart than he was otherwise wont to do--in six different
camps constructed in the cantons of the Bellovaci, Ambiani, Morini,
Nervii, Remi, and Eburones. The fixed camp placed farthest towards
the east in the territory of the Eburones, probably not far
from the later Aduatuca (the modern Tongern), the strongest of all,
consisting of a legion under one of the most respected of Caesar's
leaders of division, Quintus Titurius Sabinus, besides different
detachments led by the brave Lucius Aurunculeius Cotta(43) and amounting
together to the strength of half a legion, found itself all of a sudden
surrounded by the general levy of the Eburones under the kings Ambiorix
and Catuvolcus. The attack came so unexpectedly, that the very men
absent from the camp could not be recalled and were cut off
by the enemy; otherwise the immediate danger was not great,
as there was no lack of provisions, and the assault, which the Eburones
attempted, recoiled powerless from the Roman intrenchments.
But king Ambiorix informed the Roman commander that all the Roman camps
in Gaul were similarly assailed on the same day, and that the Romans
would undoubtedly be lost if the several corps did not quickly set out
and effect a junction; that Sabinus had the more reason to make haste,
as the Germans too from beyond the Rhine were already advancing
against him; that he himself out of friendship for the Romans
would promise them a free retreat as far as the nearest
Roman camp, only two days' march distant. Some things
in these statements seemed no fiction; that the little canton
of the Eburones specially favoured by the Romans(44) should have
undertaken the attack of its own accord was in reality incredible,
and, owing to the difficulty of effecting a communication with the other
far-distant camps, the danger of being attacked by the whole
mass of the insurgents and destroyed in detail was by no means
to be esteemed slight; nevertheless it could not admit of the smallest
doubt that both honour and prudence required them to reject
the capitulation offered by the enemy and to maintain the post
entrusted to them. Yet, although in the council of war numerous
voices and especially the weighty voice