the bombastic oratory of self-elected politicians and patriots
the people were led to believe that the whole business would be
settled in a few weeks. This folly led to a serious evil, namely, the
enlistment of soldiers for only ninety days. Lee, who understood war,
pleaded in favor of the engagement being for the term of war, but he
pleaded in vain. To add to his military difficulties, the politicians
insisted upon the officers being elected by their men. This was a
point which, in describing to me the constitution of his army, Lee
most deplored.

The formation of an army with the means alone at his disposal was a
colossal task. Everything had to be created by this extraordinary man.
The South was an agricultural, not a manufacturing, country, and the
resources of foreign lands were denied it by the blockade of its ports
maintained by the fleet of the United States. Lee was a thorough man
of business, quick in decision, yet methodical in all he did. He knew
what he wanted. He knew what an army should be, and how it should be
organized, both in a purely military as well as an administrative
sense. In about two months he had created a little army of fifty
thousand men, animated by a lofty patriotism and courage that made
them unconquerable by any similarly constituted army. In another month
this army, at Bull Run, gained a complete victory over the Northern
invaders, who were driven back across the Potomac like herds of
frightened sheep.

The Confederates did not follow up their victory at Bull Run. A rapid
and daring advance would have given them possession of Washington,
their enemy's capital. Political considerations at Richmond were
allowed to outweigh the very evident military expediency of reaping a
solid advantage from this their first great success. Often afterward,
when this attempt to allay the angry feelings of the North against the
act of secession had entirely failed, was this action of their
political rulers lamented by the Confederate commanders.

In this article, to attempt even a sketch of the subsequent military
operations is not to be thought of. Both sides fought well, and both
have such true reason to be proud of their achievements that they can
now afford to hear the professional criticisms of their English
friends in the same spirit that we Britishers have learned to read of
the many defeats inflicted upon our arms by General Washington.

As a student of war I would fain linger over the interes