uation, and the hopelessness of making any progress through the
agency of China. 'We seem,' said Lord Curzon, 'in respect to our policy
in Tibet, to be moving in a vicious circle. If we apply to Tibet we
either receive no reply or are referred to the Chinese Resident; if we
apply to the latter, he excuses his failure by his inability to put any
pressure upon Tibet.' In the famous despatch of January 8, 1903, the
Viceroy described the Chinese suzerainty as 'a political fiction,' only
maintained because of its convenience to both parties. China no doubt is
capable of sending sufficient troops to Lhasa to coerce the Tibetans.
But it has suited her book to maintain the present elusive and anomalous
relations with Tibet, which are a securer buttress to her western
dependencies against encroachment than the strongest army corps. For
many years we have been the butt of the Tibetans, and China their
stalking-horse.

The Tibetan attitude was clearly expressed by the Shigatze officials at
Khamba Jong in September last year, when they openly boasted that 'where
Chinese policy was in accordance with their own views they were ready
enough to accept the Amban's advice; but if this advice ran counter in
any respect to their national prejudices, the Chinese Emperor himself
would be powerless to influence them.' China has on several occasions
confessed her inability to coerce the Tibetans. She has proved herself
unable to enforce the observance of treaties or even to restrain her
subjects from invading our territory, and during the recent attempts at
negociations she had to admit that her representative in Lhasa was
officially ignored, and not even allowed transport to travel in the
country. In the face of these facts her exceedingly shadowy suzerainty
may be said to have entirely evaporated, and it is unreasonable to
expect us to continue our relations with Tibet through the medium of
Peking.

It was not until nine years after the signing of the convention that we
made any attempt to open direct communications with the Tibetans
themselves. It is astonishing that we allowed ourselves to be hoodwinked
so long. But this policy of drift and waiting is characteristic of our
foreign relations all over the world. British Cabinets seem to believe
that cure is better than prevention, and when faced by a dilemma have
seldom been known to act on the initiative, or take any decided course
until the very existence of their dependency is imperilled