doubtful if he could have organized a popular party of any
strength.

It may be asked, then, What is, or was, the nature of the Russian menace
in Tibet? It is true that a Russian invasion on the North-East frontier
is out of the question. For to reach the Indian passes the Russians
would have to traverse nearly 1,500 miles of almost uninhabited country,
presenting difficulties as great as any we had to contend with during
the recent campaign. But the establishment of Russian influence in Lhasa
might mean military danger of another kind. It would be easy for her to
stir up the Tibetans, spread disaffection among the Bhutanese, send
secret agents into Nepal, and generally undermine our prestige. Her aim
would be to create a diversion on the Tibet frontier at any time she
might have designs on the North-West. The pioneers of the movement had
begun their work. They were men of the usual type--astute, insidious, to
be disavowed in case of premature discovery, or publicly flaunted when
they had prepared any ground on which to stand.

Our countermove--the Tibet Expedition--must have been a crushing and
unexpected blow to Russia. For the first time in modern history Great
Britain had taken a decisive, almost high-handed, step to obviate a
danger that was far from imminent. We had all the best cards in our
hands. Russia's designs in Lhasa became obvious at a time when we could
point to open defiance on the part of the Tibetans, and provocation such
as would have goaded any other European nation to a punitive expedition
years before. We could go to Lhasa, apparently without a thought of
Russia, and yet undo all the effects of her scheming there, and deal
her prestige a blow that would be felt throughout the whole of Central
Asia. Such was Lord Curzon's policy. It was adopted in a half-hearted
way by the Home Government, and eventually forced on them by the conduct
of the Tibetans themselves. Needless to say, the discovery of Russian
designs was the real and prime cause of the despatch of the mission,
while Tibet's violation of treaty rights and refusal to enter into any
relations with us were convenient as ostensible motives. It cannot be
denied that these grievances were valid enough to justify the strongest
measures.

In June, 1903, came the announcement of Colonel Younghusband's mission
to Khamba Jong. I do not think that the Indian Government ever expected
that the Tibetans would come to any agreement with us at Khamba Jon