the only
bar to a complete understanding with Tibet was the obstinacy of the
Regent and the Chinese agents at Lhasa, who were inspired by Peking. An
attempt was arranged to influence the Chinese Government in the matter,
but both Bogle and the Teshu Lama died before it could be carried out.
Ten years later Turner was despatched to Tibet, and received the same
welcome as his predecessor. Everything pointed to the continuance of a
steady and consistent policy by which the barrier of obstruction might
have been broken down. But Warren Hastings was recalled in 1785, and
Lord Cornwallis, the next Governor-General, took no steps to approach
and conciliate the Tibetans. It was in 1792 that the Tibetan-Nepalese
War broke out, which, owing to the misrepresentations of China,
precluded any possibility of an understanding between India and Tibet.
Such was the uncompromising spirit of the Lamas that, until Lord
Dufferin sanctioned the commercial mission of Mr. Colman Macaulay in
1886, no succeeding Viceroy after Warren Hastings thought it worth while
to renew the attempt to enter into friendly relations with the country.

The Macaulay Mission incident was the beginning of that weak and
abortive policy which lost us the respect of the Tibetans, and led to
the succession of affronts and indignities which made the recent
expedition to Lhasa inevitable. The escort had already advanced into
Sikkim, and Mr. Macaulay was about to join it, when orders were received
from Government for its return. The withdrawal was a concession to the
Chinese, with whom we were then engaged in the delimitation of the
Burmese frontier. This display of weakness incited the Tibetans to such
a pitch of vanity and insolence that they invaded our territory and
established a military post at Lingtu, only seventy miles from
Darjeeling.

We allowed the invaders to remain in the protected State of Sikkim two
years before we made any reprisal. In 1888, after several vain appeals
to China to use her influence to withdraw the Tibetan troops, we
reluctantly decided on a military expedition. The Tibetans were driven
from their position, defeated in three separate engagements, and pursued
over the frontier as far as Chumbi. We ought to have concluded a treaty
with them on the spot, when we were in a position to enforce it, but we
were afraid of offending the susceptibilities of China, whose suzerainty
over Tibet we still recognised, though she had acknowledged her
inabi