avies would remain neutral if they did not actively
co-operate with ours. It was only through the medium of such friendships
that ultimate naval preponderance could be secured. The consciousness of
that fact pervaded the Entente. With those responsible for the conduct
of tremendous affairs probability has to be the guide of life. The
question is always not what ought to happen but what is most likely to
happen.

On the details of the diplomatic aspect of our endeavor, and on the
spirit in which it was sought to carry it out, the second and third
chapters of the book may serve to throw some light. The fourth chapter
relates to the strategical plan, worked out after much consideration,
for the possible event of failure. The plan was throughout based on the
maintenance of superior sea power as the paramount instrument. As is
indicated, the conservation of sufficient sea power implied as essential
close and friendly relations with France, and also with Russia. Had
there been no initial reason for the Entente policy, to be found in the
desire to get rid of all causes of friction with these two great
nations, the preservation of the prospect of continuing able to command
the sea in war would in itself have necessitated the Entente. This
conclusion was the result of the stocktaking of their assets for
self-defense which the Entente Powers had to make when confronted with
the growing organization for war of the Central Powers.

To set up the balancing of Powers as a principle was what we in this
country would have been glad to have avoided had it been practicable to
do so. We should have preferred the freedom of our old position of
"splendid isolation." But the growing preparations of the Central Powers
compelled Great Britain, France, and Russia to think of safety for each
of them severally as to be secured only by treating such safety as a
common interest. In the face of a new and growing danger we dared not
leave ourselves to the risk of being dealt with in detail. The first
thing to be done was, if possible, to convince the Central Powers that
it would be to their own advantage to come to a complete agreement with
us, an agreement of a business character, analogous to that which Lord
Lansdowne had so satisfactorily concluded with France, and accompanied
by cessation of the reasons which had led them to pile up armaments.
There were highly influential persons in Germany who were far from
averse to the suggested business arr