thority of Austrian officers, and told Servia to submit to this within
forty-eight hours. In other words, the Sovereign of Servia was
practically told to take off not only the laurels of two great
campaigns, but his own lawful and national crown, and to do it in a time
in which no respectable citizen is expected to discharge a hotel bill.
Servia asked for time for arbitration--in short, for peace. But Russia
had already begun to mobilize, and Prussia, presuming that Servia might
thus be rescued, declared war.

Between these two ends of fact, the ultimatum to Servia, the ultimatum
to Belgium, any one so inclined can, of course, talk as if everything
were relative. If any one asks why the Czar should rush to the support
of Servia, it is easy to ask why the Kaiser should rush to the support
of Austria. If any one say that that the French would attack the
Germans, it is sufficient to answer that the Germans did attack the
French.

There remain, however, two attitudes to consider, even perhaps two
arguments to counter, which can best be considered and countered under
this general head of facts. First of all, there is a curious, cloudy
sort of argument, much affected by the professional rhetoricans of
Prussia, who are sent out to instruct and correct the minds of Americans
or Scandinavians. It consists of going into convulsions of incredulity
and scorn at the mention of Russia's responsibility for Servia or
England's responsibility for Belgium; and suggesting that, treaty or no
treaty, frontier or no frontier, Russia would be out to slay Teutons or
England to steal colonies.

*England Kept Her Contracts.*

Here, as elsewhere, I think the professors dotted all over the Baltic
plain fail in lucidity and in the power of distinguishing ideas. Of
course, it is quite true that England has material interests to defend,
and will probably use the opportunity to defend them; or, in other
words, of course England, like everybody else, would be more comfortable
if Prussia were less predominant. The fact remains that we did not do
what the Germans did. We did not invade Holland to seize a naval and
commercial advantage; and whether they say that we wished to do it in
our greed or feared to do it in our cowardice, the fact remains that we
did not do it. Unless this common sense principle be kept in view, I
cannot conceive how any quarrel can possibly be judged. A contract may
be made between two persons solely for material advantag