greater
part of the public might well have hesitated to enter into a quarrel
where the cause seemed remote and the issues ill-defined. What was it to
us if a Slav or a Teuton collected the harbor due of Saloniki! So the
question might have presented itself to the average man who in the long
run is the ruler of this country and the autocrat of its destinies. In
spite of all the wisdom of our statesmen, it is doubtful if on such a
quarrel we could have gained that national momentum which might carry us
to victory. But at that very moment Germany took a step which removed
the last doubt from the most cautious of us and left us in a position
where we must either draw our sword or stand forever dishonored and
humiliated before the world. The action demanded of us was such a
compound of cowardice and treachery that we ask ourselves in dismay what
can we ever have done that could make others for one instant imagine us
to be capable of so dastardly a course. Yet that it was really supposed
that we could do it, and that it was not merely put forward as an excuse
for drawing us into war, is shown by the anger and consternation of the
Kaiser and his Chancellor when we drew back from what the British Prime
Minister had described as "an infamous proposal." One has only to read
our Ambassador's description of his interview with the German Chancellor
after our decision was announced, "so evidently overcome by the news of
our action," to see that through some extraordinary mental aberration
the German rulers did actually believe that a vital treaty with
Britain's signature upon it could be regarded by this country as a mere
"scrap of paper."
*The Treaty of 1839.*
What was this treaty which it was proposed so lightly to set aside? It
was the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium signed in 1839 (confirmed
verbally and in writing by Bismarck in 1870) by Prussia, France, and
Britain, each of whom pledged their word to observe and to enforce it.
On the strength of it Belgium had relied for her security amid her
formidable neighbors. On the strength of it also France had lavished all
her defenses upon her eastern frontier, and left her northern exposed to
attack. Britain had guaranteed the treaty, and Britain could be relied
upon. Now, on the first occasion of testing the value of her word it was
supposed that she would regard the treaty as a worthless scrap of paper,
and stand by unmoved while the little State which had trusted her wa
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