oon as the spring was fairly
open, we should have to move directly against our antagonist,
General Jos. E. Johnston, then securely intrenched at Dalton,
thirty miles distant; and the purpose of our conference at the time
was to ascertain our own resources, and to distribute to each part
of the army its appropriate share of work. We discussed every
possible contingency likely to arise, and I simply instructed each
army commander to make immediate preparations for a hard campaign,
regulating the distribution of supplies that were coming up by rail
from Nashville as equitably as possible. We also agreed on some
subordinate changes in the organization of the three separate
armies which were destined to take the field; among which was the
consolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps (Howard and Slocum)
into a single corps, to be commanded by General Jos. Hooker.
General Howard was to be transferred to the Fourth Corps, vice
Gordon Granger to avail himself of his leave of absence; and
General Slocum was to be ordered down the Mississippi River, to
command the District of Vicksburg. These changes required the
consent of the President, and were all in due time approved.

The great question of the campaign was one of supplies. Nashville,
our chief depot, was itself partially in a hostile country, and
even the routes of supply from Louisville to Nashville by rail, and
by way of the Cumberland River, had to be guarded. Chattanooga
(our starting-point) was one hundred and thirty-six miles in front
of Nashville, and every foot of the way, especially the many
bridges, trestles, and culverts, had to be strongly guarded against
the acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy's cavalry.
Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia, it was manifest that
we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard it
likewise: General Thomas's army was much the largest of the three,
was best provided, and contained the best corps of engineers,
railroad managers, and repair parties, as well as the best body of
spies and provost-marshals. On him we were therefore compelled in a
great measure to rely for these most useful branches of service. He
had so long exercised absolute command and control over the railroads
in his department, that the other armies were jealous, and these
thought the Army of the Cumberland got the lion's share of the
supplies and other advantages of the railroads. I found a good deal
of feeling in the