'.', etc.
And this is indeed the case, since the symbol in 'p' and 'q' itself
presupposes 'C', 'P', etc. If the sign 'p' in 'p C q' does not stand for
a complex sign, then it cannot have sense by itself: but in that case
the signs 'p C p', 'p. p', etc., which have the same sense as p, must
also lack sense. But if 'p C p' has no sense, then 'p C q' cannot have a
sense either.

5.5151 Must the sign of a negative proposition be constructed with that
of the positive proposition? Why should it not be possible to express a
negative proposition by means of a negative fact? (E.g. suppose that "a'
does not stand in a certain relation to 'b'; then this might be used
to say that aRb was not the case.) But really even in this case the
negative proposition is constructed by an indirect use of the positive.
The positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the
negative proposition and vice versa.

5.52 If E has as its values all the values of a function fx for all
values of x, then N(E) = P(dx). fx.

5.521 I dissociate the concept all from truth-functions. Frege and
Russell introduced generality in association with logical productor
logical sum. This made it difficult to understand the propositions
'(dx). fx' and '(x) . fx', in which both ideas are embedded.

5.522 What is peculiar to the generality-sign is first, that it
indicates a logical prototype, and secondly, that it gives prominence to
constants.

5.523 The generality-sign occurs as an argument.

5.524 If objects are given, then at the same time we are given all
objects. If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time all
elementary propositions are given.

5.525 It is incorrect to render the proposition '(dx). fx' in the
words, 'fx is possible' as Russell does. The certainty, possibility, or
impossibility of a situation is not expressed by a proposition, but
by an expression's being a tautology, a proposition with a sense, or
a contradiction. The precedent to which we are constantly inclined to
appeal must reside in the symbol itself.

5.526 We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalized
propositions, i.e. without first correlating any name with a particular
object.

5.5261 A fully generalized proposition, like every other proposition, is
composite. (This is shown by the fact that in '(dx, O). Ox' we have
to mention 'O' and 's' separately. They both, independently, stand in
signifying relations to