r be a soul.

5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes
the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to
be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this
requirement.)

5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents
are related to one another in such and such a way. This no doubt also
explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube;
and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts. (If I
look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the
b's, then the a's appear to be in front, and vice versa).

5.55 We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible
forms of elementary propositions. Elementary propositions consist of
names. Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with
different meanings, we are also unable to give the composition of
elementary propositions.

5.551 Our fundamental principle is that whenever a question can be
decided by logic at all it must be possible to decide it without more
ado. (And if we get into a position where we have to look at the world
for an answer to such a problem, that shows that we are on a completely
wrong track.)

5.552 The 'experience' that we need in order to understand logic is not
that something or other is the state of things, but that something
is: that, however, is not an experience. Logic is prior to every
experience--that something is so. It is prior to the question 'How?' not
prior to the question 'What?'

5.5521 And if this were not so, how could we apply logic? We might put
it in this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no world,
how then could there be a logic given that there is a world?

5.553 Russell said that there were simple relations between different
numbers of things (individuals). But between what numbers? And how is
this supposed to be decided?--By experience? (There is no pre-eminent
number.)

5.554 It would be completely arbitrary to give any specific form.

5.5541 It is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the question
whether I can get into a position in which I need the sign for a
27-termed relation in order to signify something.

5.5542 But is it really legitimate even to ask such a question? Can we
set up a form of sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to
it? Does it make sense to ask what there must be in order