that something
can be the case?

5.555 Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions quite
apart from their particular logical forms. But when there is a system by
which we can create symbols, the system is what is important for logic
and not the individual symbols. And anyway, is it really possible that
in logic I should have to deal with forms that I can invent? What I have
to deal with must be that which makes it possible for me to invent them.

5.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary
propositions. We can foresee only what we ourselves construct.

5.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects.
The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary
propositions. Hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.

5.5562 If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be
elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in
their C form must know It.

5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as
they stand, are in perfect logical order.--That utterly simple thing,
which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but
the truth itself in its entirety. (Our problems are not abstract, but
perhaps the most concrete that there are.)

5.557 The application of logic decides what elementary propositions
there are. What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate. It
is clear that logic must not clash with its application. But logic
has to be in contact with its application. Therefore logic and its
application must not overlap.

5.5571 If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are,
then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense. 5.6 The limits
of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its
limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and
this, but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were
excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it
would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for
only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot
say either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there
is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
cannot be said, but