at a religion might have a certain artistic
value independent of its truth. But he was as far as Renan or as the
most thorough-going of historical critics from believing in the divinity
of Christ or the truth of the Christian inspiration. But, in spite of
this, he still held to his version of the doctrine of probability. It is
summed up in Pascal's famous _il faut parier_. We can neither put aside
the great religious questions nor give a positive answer to them. We
must act on the hypothesis that one answer or the other is true; but we
must not allow any juggling to transmute a judgment of probability into
an undoubting conviction of truth. There are real arguments on both
sides, and we must not ignore the existence of either. In the attack
upon Manning he indicates his reasons for believing in a God. He accepts
the argument from final causes, which is, of course, the only argument
open to a thorough empiricist, and holds that it is not invalidated,
though it is, perhaps, modified by recent scientific inquiries. It is
probable, therefore, that there is a God, though we cannot regard the
point as proved in such a sense as to afford any basis for expecting or
not expecting a revelation. On the contrary, all analogy shows that in
theological, as in all other matters, the race has to feel its way
gradually to truth through innumerable errors. In writing to a friend
about the Manning article he explains himself more fully. Such articles,
he says, give a disproportionate importance to the negative side of his
views. His positive opinions, if 'vague, are at least very deep.' He
cannot believe that he is a machine; he believes that the soul must
survive the body; that this implies the existence of God; that those two
beliefs make 'the whole difference between the life of a man and the
life of a beast.' The various religions, including Christianity, try to
express these beliefs, and so long as they are honestly and simply
believed are all good in various degrees. But when the creeds are held
on the ground of their beauty or utility, not on the ground of their
demonstrable truth, they become 'the most corrupt and poisonous objects
in the world, eating away all force, and truth, and honour so far as
their influence extends.' To propose such beliefs on any ground but the
ground of truth, 'is like keeping a corpse above ground because it was
the dearest and most beloved of all objects when it was alive.' He does
not object to authorit
|