wn position in India in the days of Wellesley. It is
idle to denounce them for acting as we acted; but it is clear that the
two empires will ultimately become conterminous; and it is, therefore,
essential for us that the dividing line should be so drawn as to place
us in perfect security. Though Fitzjames declined to draw any specific
moral, his antagonists insisted upon drawing one for him. He must be
meaning to insinuate that we were to disregard any rights of the Afghans
which might conflict with our alleged interests.

This point was touched in a letter by Lord Lawrence, to which Fitzjames
felt bound to reply. He was reluctant to do so, because he was on terms
of personal friendship with Lawrence, whose daughter had recently become
the wife of Henry Cunningham. 'I have seldom,' says Fitzjames (October
4, 1877), 'met a more cheery, vivacious, healthy-minded old hero.'
Lawrence, he is glad to think, took a fancy to him, and frequently
poured himself out abundantly upon Indian topics. Their friendship,
happily, was not interrupted by the controversy, in which Fitzjames was
scrupulously respectful. This, again, raised the old question about
International Law, which Fitzjames, as a good Austinian, regarded mainly
as a figment. The moral point, however, is the only one of general
interest. Are we bound to treat semi-barbarous nations on the same terms
as we consider to govern our relations with France or Germany? Or are we
morally entitled to take into account the fact that they are
semi-barbarous? Fitzjames's view may be briefly defined. He repudiates
emphatically the charge of immorality. He does not hold the opinion
imputed to him by his antagonists that we may take what territory we
please, regardless of the interests of barbarous natives. He repeats his
assertion that our rule rests upon justice as well as force. He insists
upon the same point, I may add, in his private letters to Lytton, and
declares that it is even more important to be straightforward and to
keep our word sacredly with Afghans than with civilised races. He writes
very warmly upon the danger of exacting excessive punishment for the
murder of Cavagnari. We ought to prove to the natives that our rule is
superior to theirs, and that we are strong enough to keep our heads and
be merciful even in the face of insults. But then, we have to act upon
our own conceptions of morality, and must not be hampered by regarding
nations as fictitious persons with indi